Heatwave hits grain harvest

Europe’s June heatwave wiped more than €2bn from the value of its grain crop, according to new analysis, with France and Hungary bearing the brunt of the damage. Almost 9mn tonnes were removed from forecasts for grain production across the EU and UK in the four weeks following the heatwave, according to Coceral, the European grain traders’ association.

Analysis by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit valued the lost production at about €2.1bn in national farm-gate prices for wheat, barley, maize and other grains, or about 5 per cent using 2025 production value estimates. The heat struck wheat during the critical period when kernels were filling in central and southern France, southern Germany, Austria, Poland and Hungary, Coceral told the Financial Times.

Spring barley was more badly affected than the winter barley crop, which was largely developed before the temperatures rose. The hottest June on record for western Europe follows a temperature rise of 3C over the 1991-2020 average, In France, the thermometer reached a high of more than 43C and in Hungary the peak was more than 40C. About half of the reduction in Europe’s grain forecast came from maize, used mainly for livestock feed, which was caught during pollination in France and Hungary. Coceral cut its forecast for the EU and UK maize crop from 57.2mn tonnes to 52.7mn tonnes. The EU is a net importer of the crop in poor harvest years, meaning the shortfall could increase demand for shipments from suppliers including Ukraine and Brazil.

The smaller French harvest could also reduce the amount of wheat available for export to buyers in north and west Africa, while higher feed costs are likely to filter through to livestock producers in coming months. France accounted for almost half of the grain crop damage. Its forecast was cut by 4.1mn tonnes, worth about €891mn at current prices.

Most of its reduction came from maize, for which the forecast was lowered by 3.35mn tonnes to 9.4mn tonnes — below even the crop produced during the severe drought of 2022. Hungary suffered the second-largest hit, with its grain forecast cut by 2.4mn tonnes, valued at about €444mn.

Spain lost a further 1.4mn tonnes, worth €276mn, while Germany’s forecast was lowered by roughly the same amount, equivalent to €233mn of production. The impact could be exacerbated for Hungarian farmers because domestic producer prices fell as the harvest approached, with cheaper Black Sea grain weighing on the market.

That leaves growers facing the loss of production without the partial offset from higher prices, which could be received by some French farmers. “This will hit farmers in the pockets, reducing their income and undermining European food security at the same time,” Tom Lancaster, ECIU land, food and farming analyst told th\e FT.

The losses come as EU governments negotiate the future of the bloc’s Common Agricultural Policy. Théo Paquet, senior policy officer at the European Environmental Bureau, told the Pink ‘Un that instead of subsidies being used to fund resilience to climate change, they “continue to fund harmful practices that contribute directly to these crises — fuelling an expensive and unsustainable feedback loop”.

Weather in Soutrhern Europe hits food supplies

Fence to keep out wild boar on a family member's farm in Spain

Voters and consumers particularly react to food price inflation which has remained relatively high.  I certainly notice it on my trips to the supermarket and I am not a poorer consumer.   The least well off spend a great portion of their budgets on food and often have to rely on food banks.

One of my children has a small retirement farm in Spain and tells me that January has been unusually cold and wet, albeit that has replenished their water source.   The almond trees do seem to have blossomed more or less on schedule.

A lot of big fruit and vegetable producers in the UK decamp to Spain for the winter.   The carbon footprint of growing tomatoes under heated glass is greater.

A wave of extreme rain and flooding across the Mediterranean countries and north Africa has battered the winter growing regions that feed Europe, disrupting supplies of fruit and vegetables and threatening food price rises. Spain, Portugal, Morocco and parts of Italy and Greece function as Europe’s winter “pantry”, exporting tomatoes, cucumbers, avocados, peppers, berries and citrus fruit northwards when domestic output is limited.

But extensive damage to crops and infrastructure in recent weeks could quickly ripple through wholesale markets and supermarket supply chains, warn economists. “When you have the types of floods that we’re seeing in Europe and north Africa, combined also with the very wet winter here in the UK . . . there’s no way around it: we’ll see the pressure on vegetable and fruit prices,” David Barmes, policy fellow at the London School of Economics’ Centre for Economic Transition Expertise told the Financial Times.

Spain, which recorded its wettest January in 25 years, has already recorded damage to 22,000 hectares of agricultural land, according to insurance association Agroseguro. Luis Planas, Spain’s agriculture minister, told the Pink ‘Un that the affected area could “nearly double” once assessments were complete. The ruin extends beyond crops to irrigation systems, farm machinery and rural roads, complicating harvesting and distribution even where produce survives.

The concentration of European winter fruit and vegetable supply in a handful of regions makes markets particularly sensitive to weather shocks. In January last year, Spain accounted for more than 70 per cent of UK sweet pepper imports and 65 per cent of cucumbers, while Morocco supplied more than a third of British strawberry and raspberry imports, according to UK trade data.

“The biggest, probably most proximate impact [from the recent weather] is the impact on fresh produce from Spain and Morocco,” Tom Lancaster at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, a UK-based think-tank told the FT. “If supply tightens, buyers may find themselves competing for smaller volumes,” he said. “You might also see an impact on quality: fruit damaged by heavy rain doesn’t travel or store as well.”

The Netherlands imports 35-40 per cent of its fresh vegetables from Spain, Morocco and Portugal, which together also provide 15-20 per cent of its fresh fruit imports during January and February, according to ING.    (Perhaps that explains why there are so many Dutch expats in my daughter’s area of Spain, indeed my great-granddaughter has a decent command of Dutch).

 In Andalusia, one of Spain’s main agricultural regions, farmers’ association Asaja estimates that 20 per cent of all production has been lost. In one province alone, Córdoba, Asaja said losses totalled €700mn, with olive groves accounting for €550mn of that sum and further damage to cereals and citrus. Last week Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s controversial prime minister, visited the storm-hit town of Huétor Tájar, west of Granada, where the mayor explained that 80 per cent of its population depended directly or indirectly on the region’s asparagus production. With harvesting due to begin within weeks, mayor Fernando Delgado said that as much as a third of the crop remained underwater.

The adverse weather across Andalusia and other major growing regions in southern Europe meant “prices would be higher year on year”, Thijs Geijer, a senior economist covering food and agriculture at ING told the leading economics and business paper, adding that consumers would see fewer discounts. But he noted that the effect on inflation data could be muted in the Netherlands, where the affected products carry little weight in the consumer price index.

 Barmes said that the latest storms were part of a wider pattern of climate shocks feeding into food price inflation. His recent research has shown that the gap between UK and euro area food inflation in recent months was largely driven by a small number of climate‑sensitive items — including chocolate and olive oil — some of which carry a much heavier weight in the UK shopping basket, leaving British consumers more affected when extreme weather hits.

“To me, there’s little doubt that we’ll see pressure on food prices later in the year, even if some of it will be more short term,” he told the FT. “It’s very difficult to substitute away from Spain and Morocco in particular for certain parts of the winter vegetable basket, so I think we’ll see that [impact] quite soon, and then later, we’ll probably see effects also on fruit, and then also on meat and dairy . . . and olive oil.”

Central banks have begun acknowledging the influence of extreme weather on inflation dynamics. In its August 2025 monetary policy report, the Bank of England noted that climate-linked disruptions were contributing to higher UK food prices and complicating efforts to return inflation to its 2 per cent target. Governments have pledged support for affected farmers through insurance payouts and EU crisis reserve funds linked to the bloc’s Common Agricultural Policy.

Spain has vowed to give farmers €2.2bn in direct aid and spend €600mn on rebuilding infrastructure.  But economists say the broader concern is structural. “I think we’re really seeing that this is not a one-off,” said Barmes. “These types of climate-related supply disruptions are becoming more frequent, severe, and geographically widespread.”

How can we get climate action in EU agriculture?

Professor Alan Matthews of TCD reports: 'A new paper just published by the EIU School of Transnational Governance puts forward a Strawman proposal to accelerate climate action in EU agriculture https://lnkd.in/dWv6GgDq. 

The three people behind the proposal are heavyweights in EU climate policy. Artur Runge-Metzger is a former Director in DG Climate Action in the European Commission, Peter Vis was central to the development of EU climate policy in several roles in the Commission, including as Head of Cabinet for Connie Hedegaard, the EU's first Climate Commissioner, while Professor Jos Delbeke who currently holds the EIB Chair on Climate Policy and International Carbon Markets at the EIU was previously Director-General of DG Climate Action. All were centrally involved in the development of the EU's climate targets for 2020 and 2030 and the initiation of its Emissions Trading System.

They have produced a Strawman proposal to accelerate the reduction in agricultural emissions with five elements which they argue can turn climate action into business opportunities for farmers and processors. Their five actions are:
1. Creating public demand for voluntary carbon farming.
2. Creating private demand for carbon farming through setting downstream mandatory (and gradually declining) emission intensity standards, for example, per unit of milk or meat.
3. Creating lead markets for novel products such as bio-based materials.
4. Introducing a farm-level incentive system to price emissions implicitly seen as a cap-and-trade AgETS.
5. A new public-private finance facility to finance necessary investments in mitigation technologies, adapting carbon stores to climate change, and support for novel value chains.

The sheer breadth of experience in climate policy design behind this proposal is guaranteed to give it a central position in policy discussions around the 2040 target, even if the authors accept that the politics of getting a political agreement "will be enormously challenging".

WG: You can say that again, given the row back there has already been on the greening of the CAP in the face of farmer pressure!  Measures on climate change have been particularly limited, althoughit is already impacting on farmers.

Agriculture needs to cut emissions

The EU’s chief climate scientist has warned that the bloc will miss its climate targets if it does not force the agricultural sector to pay for its greenhouse gas emissions. Ottmar Edenhofer, chair of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change, told the Financial Times that it would be “almost impossible” to achieve the European Commission’s proposed aim of cutting emissions by 90 per cent by 2040 without a levy on agricultural emissions.

 “[Over] the last 15 years, the emissions in the agriculture sector remained quite stable,” Edenhofer said, while other sectors had cut their climate impact. “The price signal is important because without the price signal, it is very unlikely that, basically, we can reduce emissions,” he added.

Farming makes up 12 per cent of the EU’s emissions, of which about two-thirds comes from meat and dairy production. But it is one of the few sectors in the EU to have so far avoided strict climate legislation, including sectoral emissions reduction targets, in part because of farmers’ ability to stage widespread and disruptive protests.

Earlier this year, tractor blockades and demonstrations by farmers in many European capitals catalysed a rethink in the EU about how it was approaching efforts to decarbonise farms. It prompted the commission to retract a proposed law on pesticides and delete recommended targets from a document outlining how the bloc would reach its 2040 goal.

But the issue of making either farmers or other parties in the food chain pay for emissions has risen up the agenda as Brussels starts to outline its priorities for the next five-year mandate starting later this year.

 Denmark has also been lobbying Brussels to introduce an EU-wide system after it announced the world’s first carbon tax on farm emissions in June. EU officials are weighing options including a levy on food processors that would also include incentives for farmers to use their land as a carbon sink.

But a report on the future of farming in the EU that stemmed from consultations between food and farming industry groups as well as environmental NGOs, published this month, said it was “premature” to come to a conclusion about pricing agricultural emissions.

The continuing power of the farm lobby

Behind the scenes the agricultural lobby is a sprawling, complex machine with vast financial resources, deep political connections and a sophisticated network of legal and public relations experts, argues the Financial Times in a Big Read analysis. “The farm lobby has been one of the most successful lobbies in Europe in terms of relentlessly getting what they want over a very long time,” says Ariel Brunner, Europe director of non-governmental organisation BirdLife International.  Industry groups spend between €9.35mn and €11.54mn a year lobbying Brussels alone, according to a recent report by the Changing Markets Foundation, another NGO.

Food systems are responsible for between 21 and 37 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions depending on what is included, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Over half of those emissions come from animal faming alone. Yet agriculture remains one of the last sectors in developed countries still to face binding limits on its carbon emissions. It is one of the few industries not covered in the EU’s emissions trading system, although proposals are under discussion.

The regular meetings between Copa-Cogeca, the umbrella body for farming unions and co-operative bodies across the EU, and the bloc’s officials show that the reach of the agribusiness lobby has been “institutionalised”, says BirdLife’s Brunner. Patrick Pagani, acting secretary-general of Copa-Cogeca, counters that lobbying is normal practice and “transparent” because the body publishes videos of its presidents’ main points.

Farmers in Europe say they are being strangled with red tape at a time when many are struggling with rising input costs following the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, which inflated energy and fertiliser prices. The EU’s Green Deal climate law, drafted in 2019, set out proposals to cut pesticide use and improve food systems, as well as reduce emissions from industrial-scale farms.

In the EU, lobby groups are already staking out positions ahead of the next major revision of the Common Agricultural Policy, which will take effect in 2028. The present iteration has been criticised by farmers for its attempts to tie payments to better environmental performance and cuts to pesticide usage. Following widespread protests, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has pledged that the next CAP will be “targeted” and find “the right balance between incentives, investments and regulation”.

Who benefits?

Research suggests that big farms and landowners reap far greater benefits from subsidy packages than small-scale growers, even though the latter are often the public face of lobbying efforts.

That has led to some tensions within the sector.  It has been suggested that the agricultural lobby “hijacked” the spring protests and put the emphasis on deregulation, which served the interest of the biggest industrial farms and agribusinesses, when the main concern of ordinary farmers was insufficient incomes.

FNSEA, France’s largest farming lobby has been accused of having ‘ no interest in securing income for farmers” but “a huge interest” in driving pesticide usage, because FNSEA is headed by Arnaud Rousseau, chair of agro-industrial company Avril.  At the EU level, Marion Picot, secretary-general of CEJA, the bloc’s main body for young farmers, says its members often feel drowned out by more dominant voices in Copa-Cogeca. “We are trying to make sure that young farmers are visible in other farming groups.”

In farm policy, it often seems that benefits go to those already doing well.

Alan Matthews sets out his views on the future of EU agripolicy in the light of the European Parliament elections here: https://www.europenowjournal.org/2024/08/15/thinking-the-future-of-agrifood-policy-in-light-of-the-eu-parliament-elections/

Why farmers are protesting

Some excellent in depth analysis of why farmers are protesting across Europe and how they relate to climate change: https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-how-do-the-eu-farmer-protests-relate-to-climate-change/

Look out for some further analysis that will appear soon in Political Quarterly.

Commission backs down on greening agriculture

The European Commission has thrown in the towel on plans to cut climate change emissions in agriculture: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-commission-backtracks-on-agricultural-emissions-cuts/

The recent farmer protests across Europe have undoubtedly been a factor, but there has also been concern about far right gains in the upcoming European Parliament elections which could undermine the European project as a whole.  The desire of Urusla von Ley en to secure a second term as Commission president is also part of the context: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/speech-president-von-der-leyen-european-parliament-plenary-conclusions-european-council-meetings-2024-02-06_en.

Reducing climate change emissions in agriculture are not an optional extra.   In France, for example, they account for 12 per cent of emissions, far exceeding the contribution of agriculture to GDP or employment. Unfortunately, governments in general have a tendency to back away from effective measures of climate change once they threaten current lifestyles or working patterns.   This is in spite of increasing evidence of  a climate emergency.

Apparently the intention is to have a policy that covers the food sector as a whole which is not without merit but undermined if other measures are dropped.   The Greens are calling for a windfall tax on the profits of agri-food companies.

The plan to halve pesticide use by 2030 is to be dropped.   This is, of course, not directly related to climate change.  It would have an impact on production.   Biological alternatives to synthetics are being developed and are increasing market share, but there are not enough of them and they are not suitable for all crops. This policy might also have been onerous for farmers in terms of form filling.'  According to von Leyen, the pesticides measure has become a symbol of polarization.   Shares in Bayer, the EU's biggest pesticides producer, rose by 2 per cent.

Animal welfare rules are set to be watered down and unpopular (and largely ineffective) set aside requirements abandoned.

Ag committee wants cattle kept out of emission plans

The EU Parliament's Agriculture Committee wants to exclude cattle and other livestock from plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/agriculture-meps-ask-to-exclude-cows-from-emission-cutting-plans/

Cattle are responsible for 68-74 per cent of livestock emissions.  Methane from cattle is shorter lived than carbon dioxide but is estimated to be 28 times more potent in warming the atmosphere.

In 2018 methane emissions from enteric fermentation in digestive systems of ruminant livestock continued to be the largest single component of farm-gate emissions. Enteric fermentation is a natural part of the digestive process in ruminant animals such as cattle, sheep, goats, and buffalo.   This is a digestive process as enzymes in their gut break down grass, hay and other feed.  Microbes in the digestive tract, or rumen, decompose and ferment food, producing methane as a by-product.    The gas, which builds up in stomachs, is then emitted largely through their burps

Food security prioritised over ecology

The majority of European Parliament agricultural committee rapporteurs want a new emphasis on food security even if it means watering down ecological focus areas: https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/10/STAMPED_D20227683_Lins-Wojciechowski_Ukraine.pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=96260bf5c9-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_03_10_06_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-96260bf5c9-188948165

The green transition is certainly in danger and there is a risk of taking panic measures in current circumstances.   Measures to tackle climate change had their limits in the CAP anyway. Production and environmental protection need not be an 'either or' choice.

German commission calls for CAP reform

A broadly based German commission has called for the reorientation of agriculture and food policy: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/german-commission-urges-phase-out-of-cap-direct-payments/

The report calls for a phasing out of direct payments and a reorientation of the CAP in the direction of environmental, animal welfare and climate change goals. 

The timing is a little odd as the EU has recently agreed the next five year plan for the CAP and the challenge now will be to maintain momentum.

The CAP in review

The CAP will continue after Brexit, albeit with somewhat less money, but will needed changes be made, particularly in terms of 'greening'?   I give an overview here: https://www.europenowjournal.org/2020/11/09/the-common-agricultural-policy-an-overview/

This has attracted some attention on Twitter and I am grateful for the feedback received.   One comment was that 'Seems to suggest that nitrates have been addressed by the ND....if only that were true. There is large scale non compliance with the ND standards never mind the more ambitious water framework ones.' This is a fair criticism, I simply didn't have the word budget to deal with the issue in more depth.

I should have remembered that 'many years ago the OECD “Producer Subsidy Equivalent” was renamed the “Producer Support Estimate” because not all policy transfers are subsidies but some are payments for public goods.'

'Another quibble, but not so minor: at over 30% of its budget, EU expenditure on agriculture is called "substantial", because agriculture is only 1.6% of EU GDP. Unfair comparison: the whole EU budget itself is less than 2% of EU public expenditure.' I can see where this comment is coming from and it is not without validity, but agriculture still secures a disproportionate share of the EU budget.

EU lays down the gauntlet on biodiversity

The EU has set out a new biodiversity strategy.   When I have studied it in detail I will provide some analysis, but for now the summary can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/strategy/index_en.htm

The full Communication can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/strategy/index_en.htm

It is clear that a particular vision of farming is inherent in the document which states: 'certain agricultural practices are a key driver of biodiversity decline. This is why it is important to work with farmers to support and incentivise the transition to fully sustainable practices. Improving the condition and diversity of agroecosystems will increase the sector’s resilience to climate change, environmental risks and socioeconomic shocks, while creating new jobs, for example in organic farming, rural tourism or recreation.'

In other words, intensive forms of farming may face challenges.

The Commission's new Green Deal also has implications for agriculture and it has been leaked ahead of publication: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/commission-hikes-caps-second-pillar-spending-to-deliver-green-deal/

The recovery plan from Covid-19 'aims to digitalise and modernise the farming sector to increase the EU's resilience and to lower EU's dependency on third countries.'

Something similar may find favour in the UK after Brexit.

How can the CAP reduce GHG emissions?

Climate change has been an absent element of the CAP. A proposal for a third pillar was put forward in the last round of reforms, but was quickly squashed - I suspect by agri-business interests. However, the pressures to do something are now substantial, but what policy instruments should be used?

In that respect an article in the latest Journal of Agricultural Economics is helpful: M Himics et al, 'Setting Climate Action as the Priority for the Common Agricultural Policy: a Simulation Experiment.'

They examine the possibilities of re-directing the direct income support provided to farmers to a direct greenhouse gas reduction subsidy. They find that such a reallocation of financial resources could reduce agricultural non-carbon dioxide emissions (nitrous oxide and methane) by 21 per cent by 2030, compared to a business-as-usual baseline. Two-thirds of the emission savings are due to changes in production levels and composition.

A table lists various technological mitigation options, e.g., feed additives for livestock and breeding programmes to increase ruminant feed efficiency. Crops could use measures such as precision farming and better timing of fertilisation.

The special needs of remote island farming communities like the Orkney Islands would be respected

The greening top up of Pillar 1 would be retained, as would coupled supports for sectors and regions in competitive disadvantage. There would also be support for farmers in areas with natural constraints. My example would be the Orkney Islands which receive coupled support via the Scottish Government.

However, the removal of the basic payment could be associated with accelerated structural change and variable income effects. This does raise questions of political feasibility.

In future member states will have more flexibility to choose from a menu of greening policy options. However, it is not clear how the new CAP design would enable agriculture to meet the EU's emission reduction targets.

One area of difficulty in terms of the article's proposal is the impact on the livestock sector, already under economic pressure. 'The ruminant meat sector is most affected (-10% decrease in herd size and -9% in production), but pig production is also negatively affected.' Prices for beef and sheep and goat meat would go up, but would be offset by increasing imports and decreasing exports.

There would also be a six per cent decrease in the total utilised agricultural area, particularly of fodder activities and a 34 per cent increase in set aside activities and fallow land.

Emission savings in the EU are partially offset globally due to increasing production in less emission efficient trading partners. (Not given as an example, but Brazil comes to mind).

The scheme might also penalise farmers who have already invested in emission-efficient technologies and might require above average financial incentives to achieve further GHG reductions.

The authors argue that 'taking the current status quo of the regional pattern of basic CAP payments as a benchmark for direct agricultural GHG emissions-reduction policy would be suboptimal'. In terms of political acceptability, that might be problematic.

Nearly half of Kiwi greenhouse gases come from farming

Caroline Saunders, the president of the Agricultural Economics Society writes in its latest newsletter: 'Climate change is impacting on agriculture, both through consequences such as extreme weather events and through major changes in policy.'

'New Zealand [where she is a professor] is in an unusual position with 48 per cent of its greenhouse gases coming from agriculture. The New Zealand government has passed a Zero Carbon Bill with zero emissions by 2050. The agricultural sector has until 2022 to show how it will achieve this; otherwise, it will go into the Emissions Trading Scheme in 2025. In the UK, agricultural emissions are about 10 per cent of the total, but the UK also has the ambition of net zero emissions by 2050.

Both countries must work out how to measure the emissions, the point of obligation, the treatment of methane and the methods available to farmers to reduce emissions, and how to support farmers through the transition. There is also the issue of trade and the potential substitution of imports produced with higher emissions (New Zealand has relatively low carbon emission per unit of output).

New Zealand and the UK have strong links and it will be interesting to see how negotiations between the countries address these issues. Given WTO rules, this may be through a new trade agreement and/or through promoting consumer preferences for products with low carbon footprints. New Zealand was the first country to adopt a formal well-being budget in 2019.

Whilst it is early days to see how this will transform policy, it is a step in the right direction. One consequence is a shift in policy thinking to put more weight on the well being of those in the agricultural sector, given the changes mentioned above. A key challenge for the [agricultural economics] profession is to research the distinctive role of government to ensure transitions that consider farmer wellbeing.'

One interesting consideration is how Brexit will affect any future trade agreement which is likely to be sought by the UK. One issue could well be trade offs between financial services (for the UK) and agriculture (for New Zealand).

A new type of CAP?

The French Government has supported the idea of a CAP based on creating farmer employment rather than being based on the area cultivated: Supporting farmers jobs

The second pillar would become a set of incentives and penalties with an emphasis on tackling climate change.

Trade deal with China offers hope to beef farmers

A trade deal with China that has ended a ban on exports of British beef offers new hope to beef farmers, but also raise broader issues about UK strategy post Brexit.

A ban on British beef exports to China was imposed following the BSE crisis in 1996. The UK-China Beef Protocol is expected to generate £230m of trade over the next five years. China is the world's largest importer of beef. However, it is expected to be 2021 before supplies start flowing.

In the meantime beef prices are at a low level. Large stocks of frozen beef bought ahead of the original Brexit deadline are still feeding into the system. There has been a collapse in the global leather market affecting hide prices.

More significant in the long run is growing consumer antipathy to red meat because of health concerns and the impact of cattle on the environment, particularly in relation to climate change. 'Flexitarians' are a bigger challenge than vegans.

The broader issue is how far Britain wants to move closer to China after Brexit rather than the United States. There are export opportunities, but also broader concerns about human rights, not least in Hong Kong.

Stakeholders prioritise outcomes over process

The Government has issued a response to the EFRA Committee report on its consultation document on domestic agricultural policy after Brexit: Response

The Government praises itself for the extent of its engagement with stakeholders on the trajectory of policy and certainly there is a lot of interest and concern from many different quarters on its future direction and content. Stakeholders are interested in outcomes not process and what those will be remains to be seen.

Defra states that, 'It is incorrect to say that there have been minimal discussions between Defra and the Treasury over the future funding of the new agricultural policy. We have been in regular contact with HMT at both ministerial and official level.'

Again it is not the regularity and level of contacts that matters, but the content of those contacts. We are now in a period where the end of austerity has been proclaimed alongside continued fiscal responsibility. The reality is that it is politically difficult for the Government to increases taxes, but it has pledged substantial new funding to the NHS before one even starts to think about, for example, the needs of the police and the prison service.

Spending on agriculture is likely to be squeezed over the coming years. Normally reliable sources suggest that the Treasury is happy with the direction of travel of policy towards payments justified by public goods arguments. However, they are not impressed by food security arguments, although they are interested in the possibilities of a new technological revolution.

What is still largely missing is any link between agricultural policy and health policy in relation to issues such as obesity. Healthy eating is an interest of large sections of the population, not least younger voters.

The Government's view is that 'eating healthily is ultimately a consumer choice'. This is true, but that choice can be guided and that is what Public Health England is trying to do, possibly sometimes in too hectoring a tone.

The Government argues, 'We take the view that the market remains the best way to reward the production of good-quality food. Paying farmers to produce healthy food would not necessarily result in the desired outcome of a wider contribution to public health. Farmers may be the wrong target to incentivise consumers to eat healthy food, especially where primary produce travels through the supply chain via food processors and manufacturers before it is turned into the final product that consumers purchase.'

Whilst there is something in these arguments, policy needs to go beyond a reliance on the market mechanism. For example, there is a climate change argument for eating less meat. We need to ensure that there is a good fruit and vegetable supply at an affordable price. Of course, that raises much wider questions about the roles of the state and the market.

The CAP after Brexit

The EU will lose about eight per cent of its current income after Brexit and is thinking about how to adjust to this loss. Given that the CAP accounts for 39 per cent of EU expenditure, it is at the forefront of concerns.

The European Commission has published a 'reflections' document on possible ways forward: EU finances

In terms of what it has to say about agriculture, it is an interesting mix of sticking to old orthodoxies and some signs of new thinking.

On the negative side, it sticks to the discredited argument that direct payments offer a form of 'income support that partially fills the gap between agricultural income and comparable income for other economic sectors.' It is a highly inefficient and poorly targeted means of delivering income support. Later down the same page, we are told that 80 per cent of support goes to 20 per cent of farms. (Actually, this is a stylised fact based on the Pareto rule: the actual figure is lower than 80 per cent).

We are also told that 'thanks to the CAP, European citizens have access to safe, affordable and high quality food.' One could argue that this is the result of technological advances and the innovations made by many farmers in response to changing patterns of consumer demand. Do the citizens of New Zealand lack access to food with these qualities despite the absence of subsidies?

The paper does admit that 'There is no consensus on the level of income support necessary when taking into account competitiveness within the sector.' This is because the policy does not have a competitiveness objective and is not designed to promote competitiveness.

Indeed, high tariff barriers allow uncompetitive practices to continue). A graph makes the claim that 'Agricultural trade balance shows a competitive sector', but makes no reference to the way in which tariffs keep out price competitive imports. Indeed, it is admitted that 'In some cases, these [CAP] payments do not contribute to the structural development of the sector but tend to increase land prices that may hinder the entry of young farmers into the market.'

There is a greater recognition of the need to deliver 'climate public goods and services', a serious omission in the current policy. There is also a recognition of the need to encourage farmers to invest in new technologies which is forming part of the UK debate on a new domestic agricultural policy.

The document envisages 'the introduction of a degree of national co-financing for direct payments in order to sustain the overall levels of current support.' This will not go down well in countries such as France which benefit from the current distribution of CAP funds.

There is also reference to reducing direct payments for large farms. It is suggested that there should be a new 'focus on farmers under special constraints, e.g., small farms, mountainous areas and sparsely populated regions.' Again, care will be needed to ensure that the chosen policy instruments do really tackle problems such as rural depopulation. For example, improving rural broadband might be a more effective way of stimulating new economic activity rather than propping up farms that lack viability.

Brexit and food security

Tim Lang from City University raises food security concerns in an article on Brexit: Feeding ourselves

Lang argues: 'If the UK really does want “independence” and to “take back control”, we might like to think about how our current food system, according to an Aberdeen University study this year, has 70% of its cropland located abroad, with 64% of its climate change impacts there too. Others feed us here and pollute there on our behalf.'

'UK self-sufficiency has been inexorably dropping from the high point that EU membership took it to in the early 1980s. Then it was more than 80%. Now it is down to 61% according to Defra’s statistics.'

'The UK imports 30% of what we eat from the EU. A huge amount of that is the good stuff for health: fruit and veg. We export whisky, biscuits, fat and meat. History suggests that a country which only just feeds itself is in a potentially fragile state. Just-in-time logistics means supermarkets operate on about three to five days’ stocks.'

Cows to get climate change fix

If it was April Fools Day one would think this was a joke, but a White House climate change initiative is searching for a 'cow of the future' whose greenhouse gas emissions would be cut by anti-methane pills, burp scanners and gas backpacks.

Methane is a particularly potent greenhouse gas with a global warming effect that is twenty times greater than carbon dioxide and cows emit a lot of it. A typical cow emits 250-300 litres of methane a day. The 88 million cattle in the US produce more of it than landfill sites, natural gas leaks or fracking. However, contrary to a common misconception, 97 per cent of the methane gas is released by the front end through burps, not through emissions from the back end.

Supplements such as basil can cut methane production in cows. In Argentina, scientists have created backpacks that collect gas via tubes plugged into cows' stomachs. That sounds as if it would raise animal welfare issues to me.