The EU has brought out a second report on the state of food security in the EU: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a91b3841-6021-489e-b877-7f0f5278c88c_en?filename=efscm-assessment-spring-2024_en.pdf
It highlights weather and cost concerns on supply side and high food prices on demand side.
The majority of European Parliament agricultural committee rapporteurs want a new emphasis on food security even if it means watering down ecological focus areas: https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/10/STAMPED_D20227683_Lins-Wojciechowski_Ukraine.pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=96260bf5c9-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_03_10_06_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-96260bf5c9-188948165
The green transition is certainly in danger and there is a risk of taking panic measures in current circumstances. Measures to tackle climate change had their limits in the CAP anyway. Production and environmental protection need not be an 'either or' choice.
It could be 'back to the future' as farm organisations use the war in Ukraine to bang the food security drum. There are, of course, real issues here, given the importance of Russia and Ukraine in wheat production, but there is a risk of reverting to old fashioned blunt instrument subsidies and downgrading the sustainability agenda.
In particular one could create a false dichotomy between food security and sustainability: https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2022/03/07/Ukraine-war-detonates-EU-food-security-debate-but-will-sustainability-be-collateral-damage#
I will write more about this issue in the coming days.
The Government has issued a response to the EFRA Committee report on its consultation document on domestic agricultural policy after Brexit: Response
The Government praises itself for the extent of its engagement with stakeholders on the trajectory of policy and certainly there is a lot of interest and concern from many different quarters on its future direction and content. Stakeholders are interested in outcomes not process and what those will be remains to be seen.
Defra states that, 'It is incorrect to say that there have been minimal discussions between Defra and the Treasury over the future funding of the new agricultural policy. We have been in regular contact with HMT at both ministerial and official level.'
Again it is not the regularity and level of contacts that matters, but the content of those contacts. We are now in a period where the end of austerity has been proclaimed alongside continued fiscal responsibility. The reality is that it is politically difficult for the Government to increases taxes, but it has pledged substantial new funding to the NHS before one even starts to think about, for example, the needs of the police and the prison service.
Spending on agriculture is likely to be squeezed over the coming years. Normally reliable sources suggest that the Treasury is happy with the direction of travel of policy towards payments justified by public goods arguments. However, they are not impressed by food security arguments, although they are interested in the possibilities of a new technological revolution.
What is still largely missing is any link between agricultural policy and health policy in relation to issues such as obesity. Healthy eating is an interest of large sections of the population, not least younger voters.
The Government's view is that 'eating healthily is ultimately a consumer choice'. This is true, but that choice can be guided and that is what Public Health England is trying to do, possibly sometimes in too hectoring a tone.
The Government argues, 'We take the view that the market remains the best way to reward the production of good-quality food. Paying farmers to produce healthy food would not necessarily result in the desired outcome of a wider contribution to public health. Farmers may be the wrong target to incentivise consumers to eat healthy food, especially where primary produce travels through the supply chain via food processors and manufacturers before it is turned into the final product that consumers purchase.'
Whilst there is something in these arguments, policy needs to go beyond a reliance on the market mechanism. For example, there is a climate change argument for eating less meat. We need to ensure that there is a good fruit and vegetable supply at an affordable price. Of course, that raises much wider questions about the roles of the state and the market.
The Food Research Collaboration has published a report authored by Professor Tim Lang and three other leading analysts on food security after Brexit: Feeding Britain
Three main issues are considered:
The report notes, 'Like all systems operating to finely tuned specifications, the UK food system is fragile and vulnerable to disruption. Contracts for food supplies are typically set 12 months ahead. UK food comes via a complex logistics system run on a just-in-time basis, i.e. three to five days’ supply. There are only tiny food stocks, commercial or public, held in the UK’s food distribution chain.'
Tim Lang, Erik Millstone and Terry Marsden call for a new and lasting food governance in a paper on 'Food Brexit: a time to get real': Food Brexit report
They argue, 'Brexit could, all too easily, diminish food security in the UK, where parts of our food system are already far too insecure; this rich country is pocketed with real food poverty, for example, and diet-related disease is part crippling the NHS. We understand food security to be the achievement of a system that provides food that is sufficient, sustainable, safe and equitable.
Brexit could, however, undermine all four of those aspects, in what is an already insufficiently secure food system. Moreover, the UK food system should not only aim for domestic security, it should also not undermine food security in any of the countries from which we buy, or to which we sell, foodstuffs.
This briefing suggests changes that the UK food system should be undertaking if its long-term structural needs are to be addressed. Our case is that the UK food system is highly vulnerable to the rising costs of diet-related ill-health, ecosystems damage, economic dependency, and social reliance on migrant and relatively low-waged labour.'
As far as the CAP is concerned, they state, 'So far, the national UK discussions about the various options for, and effects of, Brexit on food and agriculture policy have been discussed as if they were separate and independent variables, rather than interconnected.'
They note, 'The Brexit process is happening at a particularly vulnerable time for the UK food system - a time when it has become excessively dependent upon imports, while some of its population face worrying levels of ‘food poverty’, i.e. poverty which affects food consumption, 119 and while its productive base is declining, in terms of the number of farms and of small independent businesses, upon which it has historically relied.'
This blog piece looks at four threats to global food security and what we can do about them: Food security
The four threats identified are drought, emerging diseases, salty soils and over dependence on fertilisers.
On a hot day a group of leading experts on the CAP and related issues gathered in a basement in London to discuss the challenges from Brexit on Chatham House terms.
Concern was expressed about the capacity of a hollowed out civil service to deal with the issues. How could we administer the more targeted policy that was likely to emerge after Brexit? Government departments were structuring and organising themselves with some staff transfers taking place, e.g., from Defra to the Brexit department.
It was somewhat ironic that the first trade pact being talked about was with Australia with which we had a small volume of trade. They would free access for agricultural products, not least for sugar. What would the EU think about that?
There was no idea how tariff related quotas or the amber box could be shared out.
After Brexit, should the focus be on labour saving technology development? But how near and how feasible/financially viable were some of the big developments like crops being picked by robots?
It was pointed out that existing domestic regulations were backed up in terms of compliance and enforcement by the possibility of reference to the ECJ.
The CAP was designed to slow down structural change, so we could expect more farm amalgamations after Brexit. Asset prices would fall. However, it was agreed that there were many variables that affected land prices, not least the availability of tax relief. There was no simple relationship between farm support and land prices.
The issue of price volatility was noted and it was pointed out that the 2010 food security study was very reliant on the fact that we were in the EU. Vulnerabilities to climate change could increase price volatility. A lot of things that were not really about price volatility were badged as such.
As far as food security was concerned, the biggest problem was the lack of storage in the food supply chain and the resilience of the system.
A number of papers have been produced on the consequences of CAP and the policies that may replace it, but this is one of the better ones. It takes a critical look both at the pathologies of the CAP and the cases that have been put forward for continuing forms of subsidy: Dieter Helm
The paper points out that no other economic sector outside defence has received so much government money. It points out the CAP was the result of a very political deal, reflecting a very particular historical context. The reforms that have taken place addressed some of its deficiencies, but remain sub-optimal.
The paper subjects the three main arguments for subsidy to critical scrutiny: food security; a shift towards environmental subsidies; and public money for public goods. It points out that food security arguments still embody production maximisation. The paper then goes on to consider the key issue of a workable transition.
This is very much an economist's perspective and as a political economist I tend to take a somewhat different perspective. For example, I sometimes think it is necessary to accept a 'satisficing' (in Herbert Simon's terms) rather than an 'optimal' solution. However, I will certainly take its arguments seriously as I prepare my paper for a Welsh Assembly committee public seminar next month.
I had to do a pre-record for ITV Yorkshire about the potential migrant labour crisis in agriculture, more specifically in field vegetables and horticulture (there are also many Fillipinos working in the dairy industry).
I think there is a potential crisis, indeed some signs of strain are already emerging, but there is also a potential partial solution.
The pound is 13 per cent weaker against the Polish zloty since January and salaries are rising there. Polish shipping agents are reporting increased business.
The solution would be to restore a version of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), but to extend it outside the EU. As far as I am aware, this could be limited to specific countries.
A SAWS type scheme does impose additional administrative costs compared with the free movement of labour. There is also some risk of those on temporary work permits disappearing into the illegal labour market.
However, the alternative scenario is a reduction in the quantity of fruit and field vegetables grown in the UK, reducing even further the percentage of temperate foodstuffs we can supply ourselves. Prices would be pushed up, as imported fruit and vegetables are generally moe expensive, especially if sterling is weak.
Tim Lang from City University raises food security concerns in an article on Brexit: Feeding ourselves
Lang argues: 'If the UK really does want “independence” and to “take back control”, we might like to think about how our current food system, according to an Aberdeen University study this year, has 70% of its cropland located abroad, with 64% of its climate change impacts there too. Others feed us here and pollute there on our behalf.'
'UK self-sufficiency has been inexorably dropping from the high point that EU membership took it to in the early 1980s. Then it was more than 80%. Now it is down to 61% according to Defra’s statistics.'
'The UK imports 30% of what we eat from the EU. A huge amount of that is the good stuff for health: fruit and veg. We export whisky, biscuits, fat and meat. History suggests that a country which only just feeds itself is in a potentially fragile state. Just-in-time logistics means supermarkets operate on about three to five days’ stocks.'
The general election is an opportunity for farming and food issues to be debated and the National Farmers' Union is fully entitled to brief its members with questions to be asked of candidates. Indeed, the NFU has posed very interesting questions about any referendum on membership of the EU and what the implications of 'Brexit' might be for British agriculture, an issue that requires more systematic attention and exploration.
What I think is less helpful is any suggestion that we need self-sufficiency targets which can all too easily smack of Soviet central planning. The NFU has warned that by 2080 less than half the nation's food needs will be met by UK farming. This date is a long way away and it is not clear whether this is a figure for temperate foodstuffs or whether it includes tropical products like the ever popular banana.
The NFU's report entitled Backing British Farming in a Volatile World said that 85 per cent of consumers wanted to see supermarkets selling food from British farms. This is a bit like asking people whether they are in favour of motherhood and apple pie.
There are food security issues to be discussed, but as Tim Benton of Leeds University, the UK's global food security champion, commented: 'It remains an "open question" as to what the optimal level of self-sufficiency should be.' I would argue that there is no methodology that can tell us, given all the uncertainties. That may, of course, represent a case for being cautious, but I don't think that target figures are the right way forward.
The NFU claims that more than half the income of an 'average' farm comes from single farm payments (soon to be the basic payment). This suggests an over dependence on subsidy, but the NFU says they are needed to protect against price volatility. What would perhaps help more is a supermarkets ombudsman with more powers and a staff of more than three to ensure more of a level playing field. But then governments like low food prices.
You can read the NFU report here: Backing British Farming
Earlier this week I went to a very interesting workshop on future global food systems. As is inevitably the case, two different versions of the future emerged.
One view is that in order to feed a growing world population (of which anything between 1 billion and 3.5 billion are under nourished and 0.83 billion underweight) we shall have to continue to rely on intensive systems of food production and make greater use of new technology.
An alternative view, which was developed rather more in the discussion, was that we were going to hell in a handcart and the present system of production is unsustainable in terms, for example, of the demands it is making on soil and water and its contribution to climate change. We rely on too narrow a range of plant and livestock species and overlook crops which could be safely grown several times in one year (although whether people find some of these crops palatable is another question).
Of course, how one moves to a different system is a more challenging question and it struck me that there was an element of naivety in some of the suggestions put forward. Urban agriculture such as growing mint in a suburb of Rotterdam may have educational benefits, but it is not going to start to feed large cities. If diversity is the enemy of capitalism, as was argued, how is one going to get round that given the structural and lobbying power of big business? How can one cope with the power of supermarkets which tend to make cosmetic changes in their offer to reflect concerns? One answer that was suggested was to convert consumers into citizens in relation to food, but that has its challenges.
I would suggest that sustainable intensification offers a possible way forward. I know that it is greeted with scepticism both by environmental lobbyists, who see it as a stalking horse for GMO, and by farmers who tell me that they don't understand what it is. What it involves is an acknowledgment is that we are going to have continue with intensive farming (although not everywhere) but it has to be done in a more sustainable way by using inputs in a much more careful way. Drone technology, for example, opens up new possibilities in precision farming, making it possible to avoid the over use of fertilisers.
One also has to recognise that business is not a homogeneous entity signed up to a common agenda and that some businesses are concerned about the possible impacts of unmitigated climate change, notably the insurance industry which plays a key role in the Aldersgate Group which is a coalition of businesses, NGOs and others: Aldersgate .
Where I would agree with many of the speakers is that the analysis of power relations is of crucial importance in understanding how systems of food production operate.
Food security has been a dominant element in recent debates on agricultural policy, not least the recent discussions on CAP reform. But what do we actually understand by food security? There are a number of standard definitions out there, but in fact various actors interpret the term for their own purposes. An important article in Food Policy by Jeroen Candel, Gerard Breeman, Sabina Stiller and Catrien Termeer, identifies six different interpretations or 'framings'.
Not surprisingly, the productionist and environmental frames were dominant, accounting for nearly 70 per cent of uses. Anyone who has followed the CAP debate is familiar with the productionist frame. It is the stock in trade of those who advocate a 'business as usual', 'more of the same' CAP. As the authors note, it 'revolves around a story line that considers food security as one of the key goals of a future Common Agricultural Policy.' World food crises increase the salience of this frame.
The policy conclusion that is drawn is that the CAP should maintain 'a strong first pillar.' Agricultural production and productivity should be stimulated, 'and should be considered as a form of public goods provision, for which a financial compensation is justified.' [Needless to say, I think that this is a spurious argument, but it is certainly widely deployed].
Whilst the productionist frame is the dominant one, the environmental frame accounts for almost a third of all uses. This is of itself interesting as such a prominence would not have been achieved fifteen or twenty years ago and shows how the debate about the CAP has been 'greened'. The provision of environmental services is seen as an integral part of European food production and the emphasis is on long-term sustainability which cannot be achieved by the continuation of current policy.
Interestingly, the third most used frame is the regional one which shows how the notion of food security can be appropriated for a range of purposes. I see this as a very political frame in the sense of securing benefits for a particular set of actors. The argument here is to look after less developed regions which it is argued cannot produce at world market prices. Farmers in these regions perform an important function as caretakers of the countryside. The Scottish Highlands and Islands are a good example. Although a continuation of the CAP is supported, the present distribution of funds is seen as unfair.
The free trade frame argues that food security is best achieved by free trade. The development frame critiques the impact of the CAP on developing countries. The food sovereignty frame offers a radical critique of traditional conceptions of food security and focuses attention on people's right to food. Historically, notions of equity did feature in the debate in terms of closing the gap in the standard of living between rural and urban areas, but this framing covers both consumers and farmers and is underpinned by notions of global solidarity.
Interestingly, the European Commission uses multiple framings, invoking various frames simultaneously. My take would be that various interpretations of food security can be utilised to justify whatever line the Commission has chosen to take. The consequence, the authors argue, is that a clear vision of the relationship between the CAP and food security is lacking and policy makers may need to develop a more coherent vision [although I would add that CAP decision-making processes rarely facilitate clear strategic thinking].
Not only is this article a very useful, empirically based overview of how the term 'food security' has been used in policy debates, it also provokes thought about where we might go in the future.
As trade ministers gather in Bali the question is can a 'Doha lite' agreement be concluded to rescue something from the Doha Round of trade negotiations? Or will agreement once again be foiled by arguments over agriculture?
The developing world will still want the US and the EU to stop export subsidies for their farmers, although those paid out by the EU have shrunk away to a fraction of what they were: Export subsidies . Cotton farmers in Africa will still demand better access to the American market and a reduction in domestic subsidies. Sugar cane growers in Australia and Brazil also want better access for their products.
However, the real sticking point could be Indian insistence on rewriting the rules of the WTO on food security programmes. A 'peace clause' was agreed, intended to give another four years to negotiators to come up with new WTO rules for farm subsidies and the prices paid for staples bought as part of government programmes to supply food to the poor. 70 per cent of the Indian population is covered by such programmes which have recently been extended by legislation and there is a general election due next year. It now appears that India wants the clause to be permanent or at least apply until a final deal is concluded.
A long-term trend towards a decline in farm support was reversed in 2012 according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): OECD Report
This is perhaps a surprising development, given that government budgets are under pressure and farm subsidies offer a possible, although well-defended target. However, the OECD noted a particular trend towards increasing support in countries that emphasise self-sufficiency and they think that this has a poor relationship with food security.
This is a concern as self-sufficiency has been raised again recently in the UK debate by the NFU. Admittedly, there has been a decline in self-sufficiency in indigenous food between 1984 (95 per cent) and 2012 (76 per cent). (When foods from non-temperate climates are added in, the figure drops to 62 per cent). One might ask what the relevance of this is given that the UK operates within the CAP, but if the UK was to leave the EU this kind of discourse might become more relevant.
Admittedly, the overall increase in subsidies was 1 per cent, but that masked some sharp increases in emerging countries: 4 percentage points in China to 17 per cent of total income; 6 percentage points in Indonesia to 21 per cent; and 4 percentage points in Kazakhstan to 15 per cent. Norway provided the largest level of farm support with a 63 per cent share, up four percentage points. Switzerland, Japan and Korea were all over the 50 per cent of farmers' income level.
Farm support in the EU was consistent with the general trend, rising from 18 per cent to 19 per cent of farm incomes.
The urgent need to increase farm production in order to feed a growing global population was a recurring theme last week with a number of reports and opinions published on the subject.
The words ‘productivity’ and ‘sustainability’ were the key elements of the latest Agricultural Outlook report from the OECD and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), covering the years 2012-2021. The UN predicts that the population of the world will increase by around a third from current levels, which will mean farm production will need to increase by 60 per cent over the next 40 years.
This translates into an additional one billion tonnes of cereals and 200 million tonnes of meat a year by 2050 compared to 2005-2007 levels. In order to achieve this level, the report suggests a number of ways that this can be achieved, particularly in developing countries, including supplemental irrigation, improving storage and transport links and the more efficient use of nutrients.
Whether or not this level of production can be reached is another matter and one that many analysts feel is not possible without a considerable overhaul of agricultural policy, the rapid introduction of new technology and in a way that meets the rather loose term of ‘sustainable’ or the contested term 'sustainable intensfication'.
In this week’s issue of Agra Europe, editorial director Chris Horseman, who is one of the most experienced and knowledgeable observers of the CAP, suggests that the deadline of January 1, 2014 for the new CAP could be missed unless EU leaders can conclude the Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations by the end of this year.
Horseman argues that the crux of the problem is the fact that MEPs have taken the view that they are not in a position to pass judgement on how CAP spending should be allocated in 2014-2020 if they do not know how much overall spending will be available. Therefore, the need for their Council counterparts to agree a financial framework to provide funds for the Single Farm Payment system becomes an imperative.
However keen the European Commission may be to keep the negotiations on the reform of the CAP and on the future MFF technically separate, the two issues are politically inseparable, Horseman says, before exploring the ramifications and potential scenarios instigated by the deadline for CAP reform being missed.
It has been my view for some time that the deadline would be missed and that January 2015 was a more likely date. It has also been my view that the involvement of the European Parliament would slow down the process and make reform more difficult to achieve. The requirements of a democratic process mean that it should be involved, but the effect on outcomes may be less desirable.
The crux of the issue is that when European domestic governments are practising austerity, and are likely to do for some time to come whatever the calls for a growth strategy, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the share of the EU budget devoted to the CAP. There is a high 'opportunity cost' in terms of money that could be spent on infrastructure projects that would help employment and research and development that would enhance Europe's flagging competitiveness.
Even within the farm budget there is a strong case for spending more on applied research which would help European agriculture to meet food security challenges in a sustainable way much more than blanket subsidies.
