In the latest issue of Eurochoices the editor John Davis suggests that 'Those who favour a more radical approach to policy development [in the CAP] may now be considered "outliers".' He notes that CAP reform has followed an evolutionary path, which is certainly the case, and that as a consequence the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) has been reduced from around 35 per cent in the late 1990s to about 24 per cent in 2009 which is close to the OECD average (although the US figure is 10 per cent).
Of course, in the absence of any radical impetus, we may not progress much further. Those who take a relatively radical position may help to produce compromise positions which still lead to real progress on reform.
It is interesting that elsewhere in the issue an article by David Harvey and Attila Jambor point out the flaws in the conception that Single Farm Payments should now be interpreted as payments for public goods.
They note, 'In fact, these payments derive from and largely reflect previous coupled and production related support. They are a supplement to production-related market returns, and are treated as such by farmers.' As for cross-compliance it is 'often regarded as an unnecessary and irritating condition attached to deserved support for commercial farming.'
Showing posts with label David Harvey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label David Harvey. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Wednesday, June 02, 2010
Ag econ folks give it large to SFP
The intention of the European Commission to retain the SFP as the centre piece of the CAP after 2013 is a fundamental error according to leading agricultural economists. In a paper by David Harvey and colleagues to the Agricultural Economics Society conference in Edinburgh, it was argued that direct farm payments should be phased out.
The very idea of general direct payments was said to be unjustifiable. Payments should be reoriented from payments that are still historically linked to production-based payments and towards the guarantee of food supplies, rural economic development and protection of the environment.
The ag ecnomists argue that the overall agricultural policy problem for the EU is the preoccupation with farm incomes which dates back to the formation of the CAP in the 1950s. The bulk of an expanding budget is still spent on that objective. Despite this expenditure, average farm incomes remain below the national average income in almost all member states (which, of course, could be seized on as an argument for not making things worse by removing farm support). The economists argue that whatever governments do, they are not going to substantially improve the incomes of the less efficient and marginal farm holders.
The economists note that these payments were originally meant to be transitional. Of course, following Mancur Olson, the politics of subsidies which have concentrated effects but diffuse costs means that they are often converted from temporary to permanent payments.
Harvey revives the idea of a bond scheme to buy out these payments as first suggested by Professor John Marsh more than twenty years ago and subsequently developed by Alan Swinbank and his colleagues. Uncertainty for farmers would be reduced and they would have time to adjust to liberalised markets.
I have always found such a scheme attractive in principle, but the Commission view is that it is not compatible with cross-compliance.
The very idea of general direct payments was said to be unjustifiable. Payments should be reoriented from payments that are still historically linked to production-based payments and towards the guarantee of food supplies, rural economic development and protection of the environment.
The ag ecnomists argue that the overall agricultural policy problem for the EU is the preoccupation with farm incomes which dates back to the formation of the CAP in the 1950s. The bulk of an expanding budget is still spent on that objective. Despite this expenditure, average farm incomes remain below the national average income in almost all member states (which, of course, could be seized on as an argument for not making things worse by removing farm support). The economists argue that whatever governments do, they are not going to substantially improve the incomes of the less efficient and marginal farm holders.
The economists note that these payments were originally meant to be transitional. Of course, following Mancur Olson, the politics of subsidies which have concentrated effects but diffuse costs means that they are often converted from temporary to permanent payments.
Harvey revives the idea of a bond scheme to buy out these payments as first suggested by Professor John Marsh more than twenty years ago and subsequently developed by Alan Swinbank and his colleagues. Uncertainty for farmers would be reduced and they would have time to adjust to liberalised markets.
I have always found such a scheme attractive in principle, but the Commission view is that it is not compatible with cross-compliance.
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